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Abstract Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) employ an
evolving framework of calibrated language for assessing and communicating degrees of
certainty in findings. A persistent challenge for this framework has been ambiguity in the
relationship between multiple degree-of-certainty metrics. We aim to clarify the relationship
between the likelihood and confidence metrics used in the Fifth Assessment Report (2013),
with benefits for mathematical consistency among multiple findings and for usability in
downstream modeling and decision analysis. We discuss how our proposal meshes with
current and proposed practice in IPCC uncertainty assessment.
1 Introduction
Beginning with its Third Assessment Report (2001), characterization and communication of
uncertainties by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been informed
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by a series of guidance notes (Moss and Schneider 2000; Manning 2005; Mastrandrea et al.
2010) that share best practices and promote consistency across chapters and working groups.
The guidance note for authors of the fifth and most recent assessment report (AR5) provides
two “metrics for communicating the degree of certainty in key findings.” The first is con-
fidence, a qualitative metric ranging from very low to very high and based on assessments
of the underlying evidence (type, amount, quality, and consistency) and degree of agree-
ment (Fig. 1, left). The second metric is probability, also called likelihood, and is conveyed
through a menu of pre-defined terms, where, e.g., unlikely means 0–33% probability and
very unlikely means 0–10% probability (Fig. 1, right).
Across assessment cycles and iterative refinements to the guidance notes, a persis-
tent challenge for both authors and consumers of the reports has been confusion over the
relationship between multiple degree-of-certainty scales (Kandlikar et al. 2005; Risbey
and Kandlikar 2007; Swart et al. 2009; Shapiro et al. 2010; Jonassen and Pielke 2011;
Mastrandrea and Mach 2011; Aven and Renn 2015; Mach et al. 2017).
In the AR5, this issue is most visible where authors use both confidence and likelihood
terms together in a single statement, as seen, for example, in the findings on equilibrium cli-
mate sensitivity (ECS): “ECS is likely in the range 1.5 to 4.5 ◦C with high confidence. ECS
is positive, extremely unlikely less than 1 ◦C (high confidence), and very unlikely greater
than 6 ◦C (medium confidence)” (Stocker et al. 2013, 84). But the issue is really much
wider, since even where confidence terms do not appear in the text, all likelihood statements
should be read as confidence-qualified, where the implicit level of confidence is high or
very high if otherwise unstated (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, criteria E, F). Deep down, all AR5
likelihood statements share the form of the ECS findings quoted above.
Post-AR5 commentary indicates continuing challenges for the interpretation and con-
sistent usage of such findings (Aven and Renn 2015; Mach et al. 2017), with the most
comprehensive analysis of uncertainty terms used across the AR5 concluding that “In
practice and perhaps out of necessity, author teams adopted a spectrum of approaches in
interpreting the relationship between confidence and likelihood. Redundancies and inter-
actions across layers of characterized uncertainties were often handled differently and not
transparently” (Mach et al. 2017, 9).
Heading into the sixth assessment cycle, we contribute a proposal to solve this par-
ticular challenge. We propose a simple mathematical model of the confidence–likelihood
relationship that resolves outstanding ambiguities while respecting the qualitative nature of
Fig. 1 Confidence and likelihood scales for communicating degree of certainty in key findings of the IPCC
AR5. Figures based on Mastrandrea et al. (2010)
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the confidence scale. Our proposal also preserves the conceptual distinction between the
scientific estimate of chances (the likelihoods) and the evaluation of the evidential basis
underpinning these estimates (the confidence assessments), which is an important motiva-
tion for reporting confidence as well as likelihood. In what follows, we briefly examine the
interpretive problem a bit further, then present our proposal.
2 Reasoning with likelihood and confidence
To further motivate the problem we mean to solve, we illustrate how ambiguity in the
confidence–likelihood relationship can challenge attempts to reason systematically based
on AR5 likelihood statements. Continuing with the ECS findings quoted above, note that
the statements addressing the middle and left tail of the distribution are made with high
confidence while the statement on the right tail is made with medium confidence (Fig. 2). A
natural reading is that these confidence terms flag differences in the evidence base under-
pinning what can be said about one value range versus another: the evidence on small and
middling values for ECS warrants high confidence whereas the evidence on more extreme
values is weaker and allows for only medium confidence.
But this reading gets muddled when we try to draw out some of the mathematical con-
sequences of the individual likelihood statements. For example, starting from the medium
confidence statement on the right tail, assigning probability 0–.1 (very unlikely) to the range
ECS > 6 is mathematically equivalent to assigning .9–1 (very likely) to ECS ≤ 6. Sup-
posing that equivalent statements should enjoy the same level of confidence, we can equally
regard the authors as reporting with medium confidence that ECS is very likely less than 6◦.
But this new medium confidence statement covers the same low and midrange ECS values
where the other findings say high confidence is appropriate. Are the original and derived
statements consistent?
Or if we start from the high confidence finding on 1.5 < ECS < 4.5, the likelihood
assignment .66–1 (likely) significantly constrains the probabilities of ECS values outside
that range, as there is at most .33 probability left to go around. How much is leftover for
ECS > 6, for example? Supposing that deductive consequences retain the confidence level
of the statement from which they are derived, we can infer that ECS is (at most) unlikely
(0–.33) greater than 6◦ (high confidence). But this contradicts our initial reading of the
AR5 findings, according to which medium was the uniquely appropriate confidence term
for statements addressing ECS values beyond 6.
If our initial reading is unpromising, then how should we interpret, and resolve the ten-
sion between, these overlapping and potentially competing high and medium confidence
likelihood assignments?
Fig. 2 AR5 findings on equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS). Probability ranges are the numerical
translations of (from left to right) extremely unlikely, likely, and very unlikely
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3 Proposal
We start from the idea that the underlying metrics evidence and agreement are best judged
with respect to a concrete statement: evidence must be evidence for something, and agree-
ment must be agreement on something. The head-scratching elicited above ultimately stems
from an ambiguity in what that something is. Here, we explore the consequences of judg-
ing evidence and agreement, and hence confidence, with respect to a concrete likelihood
assignment (such as ECS > 6 is unlikely).
One consequence of this move is that confidence now participates in a trade-off with
the precision of the likelihood assignment: confidence can be raised (without going out
and doing more research) by widening the probability interval; conversely, a likelihood
assignment can be made sharper (more narrow) by accepting lower confidence. In terms of
the evaluation of evidence and agreement that underwrites confidence assessments in the
AR5 framework, wider, less informative probability intervals may enjoy greater confidence
because they are supported by additional studies or lines of evidence from which sharper
probabilistic conclusions cannot be drawn (evidence) and/or because broader statements
generally make agreement between different lines of evidence easier (agreement).
And because confidence terms attach to the likelihood rather than the outcome directly,
two findings can address the same outcome despite using different confidence levels. There
is no logical inconsistency in reporting, for example, that the probability of ECS exceeding
6◦ is 0–.1 (very unlikely) with medium confidence, and 0–.33 (unlikely) with high confi-
dence. The two statements complement one another, together giving an indication of the
prevailing trade-off between confidence and precision. Informally, these findings say “We
have good evidence that the probability is less than one tenth, and very strong evidence it is
no more than than one third.” On this approach, there is no tension at all between the mul-
tiple findings discussed above (§2). All of those findings—both original and derived—can
be understood as mutually consistent and complementary.
Usage in the AR5 conforms to this understanding of the confidence–likelihood relation-
ship insofar as authors have sometimes traded off precision in the likelihood assignment
against the level of confidence—a practice noted byMach et al. (2017), calling it adjustment
of likelihood as a function of confidence. We take our proposal to offer a clear rationale for
such “adjustments,” and a route to making them more principled and more transparent.
One benefit of clarifying the confidence–likelihood relationship is that it now becomes
possible to define what constitutes logical consistency among multiple findings. What is
needed to define consistency is an overarching mathematical structure that can relate one
finding to another and systematize the logical constraints that each finding puts on the
others.
When working with exact probabilities, the numbers assigned to different outcome
ranges ought to be consistent with a single probability density function (pdf). But here, we
want to address probability intervals. The analogous construct for probability intervals is a
set of pdfs. Assigning probability 0–.1 to outcome x means that within the set of pdfs col-
lectively representing authors’ uncertainty, the smallest probability given to outcome x by
any pdf is 0 and the largest probability given to x by any pdf is .1. (Equivalently, we can say
that 0 and .1 are the narrowest bounds such that every pdf in the set agrees on the probability
of x falling within the interval.)
So a set of pdfs systematizes, and enforces consistency among, the probability intervals
assigned to different ranges of a single quantity such as ECS. The question is how confi-
dence levels fit into the picture. We associate each level of confidence with its own set of
pdfs, where higher-confidence sets encompass lower-confidence sets (Fig. 3). This nesting
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Fig. 3 Each confidence level is associated with its own set of probability distributions. The nested structure
reflects the trade-off between confidence and the precision of likelihood assignments
of sets naturally encodes the trade-off between confidence and precision, since more inclu-
sive sets of pdfs translate to wider probability intervals for any given outcome. Multiple
likelihood-plus-confidence findings addressing the same uncertain quantity are mutually
consistent if and only if they can be modelled by such a mathematical structure.
This conceptual clarification of what constitutes logical consistency provides for the
option of an in-practice consistency check, where such a quality control mechanism (Parker
and Risbey 2015) is desirable and practical. (This would typically require consideration of
at most two nested sets.) A clear standard of consistency is, moreover, a prerequisite for
employing more formal expert elicitation protocols, as recommended by the TAR, AR4, and
AR5 guidance notes as well as a chorus of commentators (Reilly et al. 2001; Oppenheimer
et al. 2007; Shapiro et al. 2010; Moss 2011; Yohe and Oppenheimer 2011; Morgan 2014;
Thompson et al. 2016; Oppenheimer et al. 2016; Mach et al. 2017).
Our proposal also helps answer the worry that qualitative metrics like confidence are
unhelpful because whatever information they convey cannot be systematically propagated to
“downstream” modeling and decision analysis (e.g., Morgan 2014). By building confidence
assessments into a formal belief representation (the nested sets), we facilitate this propaga-
tion. The decision theory literature has developed and defended a range of decision models
that reserve a principled role for something like confidence assessments (Gilboa and Mari-
nacci 2013; Hill 2013; Bradley 2017); our proposal enables a bridge from IPCC uncertainty
assessment to this literature—the most direct link (see Bradley et al. 2017) pointing to a
model of confidence-based decision from Hill (2013, forthcoming). Similar constructs have
also been defended in econometrics (Manski and Nagin 1998; Manski 2013) and decision
analysis (Ben-Haim 2006).
Note that while we have so far spoken in terms of continuous underlying probability
distributions (pdfs), all of the above applies equally where such precision is unrealistic or
unhelpful. In particular, nothing we have said should be understood to constrain authors’
prerogative to choose the appropriate degree of specificity and precision when describ-
ing possible events or outcomes. Consider, for example, the finding that “Monsoon onset
dates are likely to be early or not to change much” (Christensen et al. 2013, 1229). This
“likely” can be understood in terms of a set of discrete probability distributions on the
simple two-way partition of monsoon onset dates: early or little change versus substan-
tial delay. Probability .66–1 for the former means 0–.33 for the latter. These likelihood
assignments implicitly carry high or very high confidence, and they are potentially consis-
tent with additional, complementary lower-confidence statements giving sharper likelihood
estimates.
While warnings against assigning probability to ambiguously defined events still apply
(e.g., Shapiro et al. 2010; Budescu et al. 2012), neither broad outcome characterizations
(the simple two-way partition), fuzzy boundaries (“early or little change”), nor imprecisely
defined phenomena (“monsoon”) formally undermine the applicability of the conceptual
machinery our proposal offers. These and other features may, however, influence the degree
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to which engagement with that machinery by IPCC authors is worthwhile in any given
instance—which will, naturally, vary across topics and findings.
4 Discussion
To provide context and highlight issues for further discussion, we note points of contrast
between our proposal and two existing recommendations for IPCC practice: (1) the sequen-
tial assessment of confidence followed by likelihood that is implied in the AR5 guidance
(Mastrandrea et al. 2010) and explicit in Mastrandrea et al. (2011), and (2) a recommen-
dation from Mach et al. (2017)—looking forward to the AR6—to foreground quantitative
characterization of uncertainties by making presentation of only the likelihood assignment
the preferred reporting option for IPCC findings. We discuss these in turn.
Regarding the sequential procedure (1), systematically assessing confidence before like-
lihood enters the picture makes that assessment a function of the outcome range alone.
It follows that a given outcome range (like ECS > 6) must be associated with a fixed
confidence level, which in turn rules out trade-offs between confidence and precision of
likelihood. But it is precisely through legalizing such trade-offs that our proposal allows
multiple findings to coherently address the same outcome using different confidence terms,
thus resolving the apparent contradictions that arise when trying to reason from AR5-style
findings (the ECS example, §2). Such “same-outcome” findings cannot be reconciled within
the constraints imposed by a strictly sequential, confidence-first procedure. Competition
between stated and derived findings must instead be averted by restricting either what can
be stated or what can be derived. Both risk relinquishing any meaningful characterization
of the evidence and agreement underpinning a likelihood assignment.
To prevent contradictions through restricting what can be stated, one could prohibit the
use of different confidence terms for different ranges of the same uncertain quantity. Were
medium confidence used on the mode of ECS as well as the tail, then likelihood constraints
derived from the mode and applied to the tail would carry medium confidence (not high
confidence as in our §2 derivation)—in line with the confidence level already assigned to the
tail. But this solution imposes an artificial constraint that restricts otherwise appropriate and
helpful use of the qualitative metric. It also raises questions about the meaning and validity
of “evidence” and “agreement” when those assessments are forced to remain constant across
outcomes ranges and likelihood judgements.
To prevent contradictions by restricting what can be derived, one must deny that a like-
lihood assignment and its consequences enjoy the same level of confidence. If probability
constraints derived from assigned likelihoods have indeterminate confidence, then our §2
illustration fails to generate a confidence-level conflict on the tail of the distribution. So
you can preserve the option of different confidence terms for different outcome ranges
only at the cost of making those terms (so to speak) non-transferrable to the mathematical
consequences of a likelihood assignment. This solution gives up altogether on propagating
qualitative assessments into further reasoning, modeling and decision analysis.
This brings us to likelihood only as the preferred reporting option (2). One rationale
for (2) might be the thought that likelihood—when used—displaces and supplants confi-
dence such that the qualitative language contains no additional information beyond what is
now expressed by the likelihood. This rationale conflicts with our proposal. When used in
conjunction with likelihood, we understand confidence to express something like Keynes’
(1921/1973) “weight of evidence” behind a probability statement, where the weight he
refers to includes the quantity, quality and diversity of evidence underpinning a claim. A
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key feature of this notion is that the same probability statement can convey a different over-
all picture of uncertainty when underpinned by different “weights.” For example, the likely
range for ECS given by the AR5 (1.5 to 4.5 ◦C) is the same as that given by the First (1990),
Second (1995), and Third (2001) Assessment Reports (Cubasch et al. 2001, 67). But the
body of research underpinning those likelihood statements grew between 1990 and 2013.
This difference can be expressed through confidence assessments.
Confidence assessments not only add information about the state of scientific under-
standing in some domain, they may also be relevant for policy making that draws on this
science. Consider two potential policies, each of which is justified by scientific findings
reported with the same likelihood level, but underpinned by different amounts of evidence
and agreement, and hence enjoying differing degrees of confidence. It seems reasonable in
such cases to prioritize the policy backed up by evidence-rich, high-confidence findings.
Likelihood-only reporting cannot support such a practice.
Yet even if confidence terms do contain substantive and decision-relevant information
beyond what is conveyed by the likelihood, one might still worry that this information is
too difficult for consumers of the reports to interpret and make use of. One response to
these worries—and the one embodied by our proposal—is to clarify the structure of the
qualitative assessments such that the information they are meant to convey might be trans-
mitted more cleanly and used more systematically. Indeed, our proposal connects neatly
into decision-making approaches that incorporate confidence into the evaluation of options
(Hill forthcoming; Bradley 2017). (Of course, this theoretical point about the possibility and
relevance of consistent confidence reporting does not preclude de-emphasizing confidence
terms in the text of the report—perhaps pushing them into the traceable account—where
the benefits of simplicity and readability outweigh the cost of losing the confidence
information.)
5 Conclusion
A persistent shortcoming of the IPCC’s evolving expert judgement framework has been the
ambiguous relationship between multiple uncertainty scales. The issue arises in the AR5
between the confidence and likelihood scales, contributing to difficulties both in applying
the framework and interpreting the findings. We have proposed a rigorous, principled solu-
tion that resolves outstanding ambiguities while also enabling mathematical reasoning from
individual likelihood assignments and providing a consistency check on sets of likelihood
assignments.
Designing an uncertainty framework for use in assessment involves striking a balance
between a host of important considerations, many of which have not been addressed here
(see, e.g., Yohe and Oppenheimer 2011; Adler and Hadorn 2014; Budescu et al. 2014; Mach
and Field 2017). More pliable language eases application across diverse fields of study and
provides wiggle room for resolving expert disagreements under the formidable time and
logistical pressures faced by IPCC authors. And improvements in terminological rigor that
add to authors’ procedural obligations may impose opportunity costs elsewhere, for exam-
ple cutting into the breadth or depth of literature authors are able to assess. While it is
important to acknowledge these many trade-offs, we have not attempted to navigate them
here. Our aim was simply to clarify one consideration—the conceptual relationship between
confidence and likelihood—under the conviction that such clarifications can only improve
reflection on current and future practice. We offer our proposal with the aims of stimulat-
ing further discussion and highlighting the importance of maintaining logical consistency
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among findings, communicating the weight of evidential support, and enabling downstream
use of assessment outputs.
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